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This research proposed a game theoretic model of a biofuel supply chain (BSC) where a 
utility company supplies reservoir water to two farmers, located in downstream and upstream 
of a hydropower dam. The decision-making process of the model is formulated as a three-
stage Stackelberg game. We analyze the equilibrium of the decentralized systems and the 
effect of the government subsidy on energy crop (switchgrass) production for cellulosic 
biofuel industries, with two forms of subsidy: (1) discriminated subsidies and (2) equalized 
subsidies.  
The results show that both forms of subsidy improve social welfare in the BSC unless the 
amount of subsidy exceeds certain limits, in which case there are negative margins for the 
farmers, and disappearance or monopoly of the markets. Increasing the subsidy to the 
upstream farmer is more efficient in improving social welfare than equalizing the subsidies to 
the two farmers. Increasing the subsidy to the downstream farmer shows the least efficiency 
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Water, energy, and food are essential resources. Since demand for these resources for 
human activities, technologies, industries, and even survival. Since the demand for these 
resources has been rising steadily with increase in the world’s population and industrial 
development, resource security is becoming a major issue for policymakers and government 
departments. Currently, the rapid population growth in many regions of the world and 
associated economic development are increasing demand for electricity and putting pressure 
on freshwater resources (IEA, 2012). The population increase could also threaten food security. 
It is estimated that energy consumption worldwide in particular will have increased by 50% 
upto 2030 (Hightower and Pierce, 2008). These factors will exacerbate the energy crises and 
water shortages in the world (Zhang and Vesselinov, 2016). Thus, we need to approach the 
water-energy-food nexus through an understanding of the interaction between the water, 
energy, and food sectors in order to improve their security. 
Security of water, energy, and food is inextricably linked, and therefore they should not 
only be carefully managed as individual resources but also be understood in the perspective of 
the interaction between them. The proper management of their connection should be given 





utilization and to reduce social costs. A comprehensive understanding of the resource use and 
flow would help induce and maintain equilibrium of supply and demand, as against an 
imbalance that may result in inefficient resource allocation and the consequent excessive social 
costs. Efficiency of use of the water, energy, and food system could be improved and managed 
effectively through an analysis of the interaction between the three resource sectors. 
Conventional policy and decision-making processes need to adopt a nexus approach which 
would reduce the trade-offs and build synergies across whole sectors through integration (Hoff, 
2011). The water–energy–food (WEF) nexus is an approach to assessment, policy 
development, and implementation that focuses on water, energy, and food security 
simultaneously (Bizikova et al., 2014). The 2011 Bonn conference provides evidence that 
improved water, energy, and food security can be achieved through the nexus approach that 
integrates management and governance across the three sectors, supporting the transition to a 
green economy that has greater policy coherence and uses resources more efficiently (Hoff, 
2011). 
Amidst research on the water-energy-food nexus, research on the biofuel supply chain 
(BSC) is one of the most rapidly developing areas, since biofuel is a promising renewable 





from food (first-generation) crops such as corn. In recent years, 40% of US corn was converted 
into ethanol (GRACE, 2014). However, biofuels are responsible for a 25–60% increase in corn 
prices (Sexton et al., 2009). In addition to price, land availability is an important factor affecting 
food security (Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın, 2015). Dependence on biofuel from food crops 
could undermine the security of food supplies such as corn (Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın, 
2017). 
Cellulosic ethanol, refined from energy (second-generation) crops, is one of the most 
promising alternatives to food-based bioethanol. Switchgrass, especially, one of the cellulosic 
feedstocks, is widely recognized as a leading crop for ethanol production in the U.S. according 
to social, economic, and environmental criteria (Bai et al., 2010). Based on life cycle 
assessment (LCA), the production of switchgrass ethanol has been shown to cause lower 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than that of corn-based ethanol, because of higher yield, 
ability to store carbon in soil, and fewer fertilizer and energy inputs (Davis et al., 2012; Larson, 
2006; Wright, 2010).  
Security of water supply is vital for both first-generation and second-generation biofuel 
crops, since a huge amount of water is consumed by irrigation. Agriculture accounts for the 





polluted or heated, that may also be considered consumptive use because the changed water 
properties compromise further uses (Hoff, 2011). Agriculture consumes about 70% of fresh 
water in the world and accounts for 80–90% of consumptive water use in the United States 
(Pimentel et al., 2004; Schaible and Aillery, 2012). 
As one of the largest consumers of water, agriculture competes directly with the energy 
sector for water resources. However, agriculture also contributes indirectly to the energy sector 
through biofuel production. Both connections will be strained by increasing concerns over 
water availability and quality (U.S. Department of Energy, 2014). 
Hydropower is another major source of renewable energy. In 2012, global hydroelectricity 
generation reached 3,646 TWh, which accounted for about 77% of total renewable electricity 
generation and it supplied 18% of the total electricity consumed (Zhang et al., 2018). Since 
they are usually a domestic source of energy and water, hydropower plants with reservoirs 
could help manage energy security and water security if the hydropower systems could be 
developed as integrated systems for hydroelectricity generation and water supply (IEA, 2012). 
Water stored in a hydropower reservoir can be used for irrigation, industry and domestic supply. 
Since hydropower plants are usually located in upstream regions, the water released to generate 





2018). In other words, the water stored in reservoirs and the water released to the downstream 
areas can be used for irrigation in upstream regions and downstream regions, respectively. So, 
considering hydropower systems with water supply for irrigation could improve food security 
(Water Resources and Environment Administration, 2008).  
Water systems supply water for human use such as drinking, irrigation, or industry. 
Although water is a public resource for everyone, excessive use and unequal water supply 
would cause scarcity of water and compromise the right to equal access to water. Water pricing 
could be a key factor in promoting efficient resource allocation and preventing anyone’s 
exclusive possession of water. In this context, the price does not need to be the same for all 
units sold; non-linear pricing is shown to permit people to enjoy low prices for their essential 
uses of water but pay higher prices if they consume beyond a certain threshold quantity. Non-
linear marginal cost pricing of water permits separation of the relatively more essential (low 
volume, low demand elasticity) uses of water from the more optional (high volume, higher 
demand elasticity) uses of water. On the supply side, many sources of water are shared in 
“common” and therefore unregulated markets tend to deplete and degrade sources of water at 





price is imposed in the form of a convex quadratic price function to reconcile the supply 
imbalance. 
In this research, our model considers a utility company as a private water supply firm that 
tries to maximize its own profit rather than other values such as social welfare. In economics, 
a private firm maximizes its own profit while a public firm maximizes social welfare, in general. 
However, in the privatization neutrality theorem, social welfare is the same before and after 
privatization when the government gives optimal subsidies to both public and private firms. 
Fulton and Karp (1989) studied the performance of a public firm in a natural-resource industry 
and concluded that the public firm pursues objectives other than welfare maximization. As 
shown in previous research, private firms and public firms may make decisions for the same 
objective of profit maximization. Thus, while this research assumes that the utility company is 
a private firm, it could be regarded as a kind of public firm under certain conditions. However, 
this paper only focuses on the situation in which the utility company pursues profit 






2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section reviews research on the biofuel supply chain (BSC) and game theory in water-
energy-food nexus.  
2.1. Biofuel Supply Chain 
The BSC, one of the most popular research areas in the water- energy-food nexus, had been 
developing even before the concept of the water-energy-food nexus appeared. Our model is 
also based on the BSC and incorporates the conventional BSC with water supply and 
hydropower generation.  
Several studies on the BSC have been formulated in centralized optimization models, 
where a single decision maker makes a decision to maximize or minimize the objective 
function (Del-Mas et al., 2011; Awudu and Zhang, 2013; Marufuzzaman et al., 2014; Xie et 
al., 2014; Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın, 2014; Kim et al., 2011). For example, Xie et al. (2014) 
proposed a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) model to minimize transportation costs 
of cellulosic feedstock through optimal location of biorefineries, hubs, and terminals. 
Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın (2014) developed a MILP model to find best decisions on 





environmental impacts of switchgrass biomass production. Kim et al. (2011) developed a MILP 
model to maximize profits of biofuel production through best transportation method, biomass 
locations, and biorefinery capacity and technologies. Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın, (2015) 
proposed a multi-objective mixed-integer optimization model to maximize economic and 
environmental benefits with optimal decisions on land allocation, seeding time, harvesting time 
and amount, and budget allocation. Cobuloglu and Büyüktahtakın (2017) extended their 
previous model to a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer programming model. Azadeh et al. 
(2014) proposed a stochastic linear programming model within a multi-period planning 
framework to maximize the expected profit. Papapostolou et al. (2011) proposed a mixed 
integer linear programming model to maximize performance of the BSC. 
Compared to the centralized framework, the BSC model with a decentralized framework 
could better consider and analyze rational behaviors of each entity in the BSC (e.g. farmers 
and refineries). The entities, as decision makers in the model, make decisions independently to 
optimize their own objectives which can be in conflict with one another. Bai et al. (2012) 
proposed a bilevel Stackelberg leader-follower game theoretic model of an integrated BSC 
with farmers’ decision on land uses and markets, and dynamic feedstock prices under market 





BSC model as a form of regulation or subsidy. Bai et al (2016) proposed a Stackelberg game 
theoretic model to incorporate more options on land use and possibility of marginal land 
reclamation in a land market, with cap-and-trade regulatory mechanism for land-use constraints. 
Luo and Miller (2013) proposed a game theoretic model of Cournot competition between 
farmers and Stackelberg between switchgrass and corn ethanol producers, while considering 
the farmers and the ethanol producers. However, this research does not study the socio-
economic impact of the subsidies on the BSC. Another game theoretical model, proposed by 
Bajgiran (2018), is modeled as a Cournot-Stackelberg game between a farmer and multiple 
biofuel refineries, and analyzes the effect of government subsidies on the BSC.  
Besides the abovementioned research, mathematical programming models of the BSC 
have been developed, in a variety of research papers. Sharma et al. (2013) reviewed 32 research 
papers to analyze mathematical programming models for the BSC with focus on facility 
location and capacity. De Meyer et al. (2014) reviewed 71 research papers on biomass-for-
bioenergy supply chain with focus on optimization methods used in the BSC. Ghaderi et al. 
(2016) reviewed 146 research papers on biomass supply chain network design (BSCND) and 
classified them into three classes: facility-related, biomass-related, and final product-related. 





production with BSC. Most of the research studied determination of facility capacity and 
location, biomass type, land allocation, and final products type.  
Although there is a variety of research on the mathematical modeling of the BSC, Ghaderi 
et al. (2016) addressed the lack of multi-objective problem research which accounts for only 
22.6% of the BSC papers. Out of the 146 papers, only 14 papers (9.6%) proposed non-linear 
programming, which is more flexible and practical to deal with real-world problems than 
mixed-integer linear programming (MILP), which is applied in 109 papers (74.6%) (Ghaderi 
et al., 2016). Consequently, the BSC field needs more research on multi-objective problems 
and non-linear programming approaches.  
Hydropower systems can be integrated with irrigation for the biomass crops. For example, 
Lacombe et al. (2014) studied the effect of hydropower development on irrigation in the Nam 
Ngum River Basin. The research found that full hydropower development could increase river 
flow during the dry season and improve water availability for irrigation. Since this research 
only considers the impacts of development within the Nam Ngum sub-basin, additional 
analysis of collective influences in the wider Mekong basin needs further research (Zhang et 
al., 2018). However, to our knowledge, only a few researchers have studied the BSC with 





has a high potential to simultaneously consider a water system and the BSC in the water-
energy-food nexus. 
In this research, we propose a mathematical model for decision-making on biomass type 
and land allocation. Our BSC model also deals with hydropower generation and water supply 
for irrigation, which has not been dealt with much in previous BSC research. The BSC model 
is formulated as a non-linear programming with a three-stage Stackelberg game, where three 
players maximize their own objectives (profits) in the game and the government also promotes 
its objective (social welfare) out of the game. The Stackelberg game theoretic approach is 
proposed to solve multi-objective problems. Moreover, our BSC model consists of two biomass 
suppliers (farmers), two kinds of biofuel producers (biomass refineries) as a corn market and a 
switchgrass market, and a water supplier (utility company) that operates a hydropower plant 
and supplies water to the farmers for irrigation.   
 
2.2. Game Theory in Water-Energy-Food Nexus 
More than one decision maker can be involved, in the water-energy-food nexus. The 





Game theory can provide a framework to study the strategic actions of individual decision 
makers to develop acceptable solutions when the decisions of multiple firms mutually affect 
the outcomes of other decision makers. Also, game theory could derive practical results under 
conditions of competition between firms, since this method reflects the interaction between the 
involved parties, which is often neglected by conventional optimization methods of solving 
multi-criteria multi-decision-maker problems (Madani, 2010).  
Hence, game theoretic approaches can be used to analyze the Nash equilibrium in a multi-
stakeholder model for the water-energy-food nexus. Especially if one entity is more influential 
than the others or is an external arbiter such as a regulating agent, and they want to manage 
water, energy, and food flows between other parties, a leader-follower type game could prove 
valuable (Garcia and You, 2016). The mathematical models could describe and explain the 
rationalization of the players’ decisions and their results in the water-energy-food nexus. 
There are three traditional competition models in game theory: a Cournot model, a 
Bertrand model, and a Stackelberg model. The Bertrand model addresses price competition 
between firms in a simultaneous game, while the Cournot model and the Stackelberg model 





 The Cournot model was first proposed by a French mathematician, Antoine Augustin 
Cournot in 1838 (Siriruk, 2009). The basic Cournot model is a static model where each firm 
rationally forecasts other firms’ decisions. Given the forecast, firms simultaneously make the 
decision to maximize their own profit (Varian, 2006). The Cournot competition is a quantity 
competition where the firms make decisions on quantity rather than on price. In each firm’s 
problem, the quantities supplied by other firms are assumed to be fixed and do not change 
depending on price change (Siriruk, 2009). The Cournot model derives a Nash equilibrium 
solution for the optimal quantities produced by each firm. The market price of the output is 
determined by the equilibrium solution with a given demand function of the market. When 
solving the single-level game, we can solve an optimization problem through putting together 
KKT conditions of each firm’s problem. 
 The Bertrand competition was first studied by Joseph Bertrand who pointed out that firms 
compete primarily in prices (Prokop et al., 2015). In the static model of price competition in 
duopoly, two firms produce a homogeneous good at identical and constant marginal cost. This 
game theoretical model is assumed to have no capacity constraint, so that each firm can satisfy 
the entire demand of the market. The firms set prices of their products simultaneously and 





the two firms. On the other hand, with discriminated prices, a firm that quotes lower price takes 
all the demand in the market since consumers would purchase the good at the lowest price. In 
the case of the Bertrand game, the winner takes all demand while the other firm takes nothing.   
The Stackelberg was first described by a German economist, Heinrich Freiherr von 
Stackelberg, who in 1934 studied competition between two firms selling a homogeneous good 
(Von Stackelberg et al., 2010). The concept of the Stackelberg game is extended to various 
research areas to study situations containing a leader–follower relationship (Chu and You, 2014; 
Chu et al., 2014). In a standard Stackelberg game, a leader takes actions first, and then a 
follower makes best responses to the leader’s decisions rationally. Hence, the two players make 
their best decisions sequentially in the Stackelberg game. In the game, the follower observes 
the leader’s decisions and the leader knows the follower’s best responses to its decisions. The 
leader has the advantage of moving first and the advantage lets the leader gain a larger profit 
than the follower. On the other hand, if the leader does not guarantee a certain degree of 
incentives to the follower, the follower may refuse to participate in the supply chain and the 
leader’s strategic plan may become infeasible or unprofitable (Yue and You, 2014). 
 For example, a single-leader-single-follower Stackelberg game can be formulated as a 







𝐹(𝑥, 𝑦)  
s. t. 𝐴𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ 0 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑚   
s. t. 𝐵𝑗(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑛   
  where 𝑦 solves  max
𝑦∈𝑌
𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦) 
s. t. 𝐶𝑘(𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ 0 𝑘 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑟   
s. t. 𝐷𝑙(𝑥, 𝑦) = 0 𝑙 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑠   
In this Stackelberg game, the leader’s decision variables are denoted by 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 and the 
follower’s decision variables are denoted by 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌. The leader’s objective function, inequality 
constraints, and equality constraints are denoted by 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑦) , 𝐴𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) , and 𝐵𝑗(𝑥, 𝑦) , 
respectively. The function and the constraints depend on both the leader’s decisions, 𝑥, and 
the follower’s decisions, 𝑦 . The follower’s objective function, inequality constraints, and 
equality constraints are denoted by 𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦), 𝐶𝑘(𝑥, 𝑦), and 𝐷𝑙(𝑥, 𝑦), respectively.  
The bilevel program is also called a “mathematical program that contains an optimization 
problem in the constraints” (Bracken and McGill, 1973), because the value of 𝑦 in the leader’s 





variables 𝑥 are treated as given parameters in the follower’s optimization problem since the 
leader’s decisions have already been made at the time when the follower takes actions.  
When solving a bilevel game such as a leader-follower game, a lower-level optimization 
problem usually can be embedded as constraints in an upper-level optimization problem. In 
case the lower-level optimization problem is replaced with the form of equivalent variational 
inequalities or KKT conditions, we can transform the bilevel problem into a single level 
optimization problem that consists of equilibrium constraints (Bajgiran, 2018). Such single 
level problems are called mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) (Luo 
et al. 1996). MPECs have been extensively employed in various research areas and industries 
including energy, transportation, and production. For example, Koh (2012), Allevi et al. (2018), 
and Siddiqui and Christensen (2016) considered MPECs as non-linear programming (NPL), 
and special algorithms have been developed to solve them. 
In our biofuel supply chain, the two farmers compete for water allocations of the utility, 
and each farmer solves a trilevel problem where the farmers (leaders) maximize their own 
profit at the upper level problems and the lower level problems, and the utility company 
(follower) maximizes its own profit at the middle level problem. Because of the convexity of 





and embed them in the utility company’s problem in the second stage as new constraints and 
solve the resultant single level problem (MPEC). Likewise, because of the convexity of the 
utility company’s problem in the second stage, we can replace the problem with its KKT 
conditions and embed the KKT conditions in the farmers’ problems in the first stage as new 
constraints and solve the resultant single level problem (MPEC). Having derived the MPEC 
for each of the farmers, we need to jointly consider all MPECs to obtain the generalized Nash 
equilibrium, which is one of the main objectives of this research. For that, we obtain the KKT 
conditions of each single level problem and combine them into one single optimization 
problem. The new problem is called equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), 
which has been previously addressed in other works and industries, especially the electricity 
market (e.g, Pozo and Contreras 2011; Ruiz et al., 2012; and Kazempour et al., 2013), but not 
much in research on biofuel supply chain. 
The Cournot game, the Stackelberg game, and the Bertrand game can be combined to 
model complicated game theoretic problems. For example, Assila et al. (2017), Caldentey and 
Haugh (2017), and Ruiz-Hernández et al. (2017) studied the combined Cournot-Stackelberg 





Li (2014) and Zhang et al. (2015) studied the combined Stackelberg-Bertrand game to deal 
with pricing game models with more than one leader, follower or both.  
In this research, we study a biofuel supply chain where two farmers and a utility company 
independently make their own decisions throughout three stages. At the first stage, the farmers 
quote water prices to the utility company. In the second stage, the utility company allocates 
water to the farmers, based on their price announcements. In the third stage, the farmers 
produce crops and sell them at a corn market and a switchgrass market, competing against each 
other. Our mathematical model consists of a Bertrand game and a Cournot game between the 
two farmers in the first stage and the third stage, respectively, and a Stackelberg game between 
the farmers and the utility company. Our model is formulated as a three-stage Cournot-













3. MODEL DESIGN 
3.1. Comprehensive Problem Description 
This research models the equilibrium of a biofuel supply chain (BSC) with three stages of 
the decision-making process, which consists of three entities (players): a downstream farmer 
(𝐹𝑑), an upstream farmer (𝐹𝑢), and a utility company (𝑈0).  
In this BSC, the two farmers are located in two discrete regions; the downstream side and 
the upstream side of a hydroelectric reservoir. Each of the abovementioned farmers could be 
regarded as a farmer union of small farmers in each region. Forming a union can bring them 
benefits such as having a more advantageous position in contract negotiation with refineries, 
avoiding unproductive competition with each other, and protecting themselves against large 
corporates.  
Both farmers produce corn and switchgrass and sell their crops at a corn market consisting 
of corn-based refineries and at a switchgrass market consisting of switchgrass-based refineries. 
So, both markets are duopolies. The farmers compete against each other in the two markets. 
The downstream and upstream farmers both have identical technology, equipment, and 





farmers make decisions to maximize their own profits, competing against each other at the corn 
market and the switchgrass market. The farmers quote the water prices at which they want to 
buy at the beginning of a season to secure the amount of water they will use during the season. 
The utility company manages the reservoir, operates the hydropower dam, and sells water 
to both farmers. The amount of water the utility company sells to the farmers is determined 
based on the water prices quoted by the farmers. In addition to the revenue from the water sales 
to the farmers, the utility company also earns revenue from selling hydroelectricity at an 
electricity market. The utility company has a low market share and little power to influence the 







Figure 1. The entire framework of the interactive decision-making in the model  
(the numbers in parentheses are the order of decision-making in the BSC) 
The structure of the BSC is depicted in Figure 1. The sequence of the decision process in 
the BSC is as follows: 
(0) Out of the BSC and before the game, the government announces subsidies to the 





(1) In the first stage, the farmers decide water prices (𝑝𝑑, 𝑝𝑢) and announce them to the 
utility company for procurement. At this stage, they do not yet decide the land allocation to 
corn and switchgrass. 
(2) In the second stage, after observing the price announcement, the utility company 
decides water quantities (𝑤𝑑, 𝑤𝑢) to allocate to the farmers. The company knows that they can 
generate hydroelectricity using the water released to the downstream of the dam and sell the 
electricity to an electricity market. 





𝑠 ) for corn and switchgrass production in order to compete against 
each other in the corn market and the switchgrass market. 
The utility company decides the water allocations to the two farmers depending on the 
water prices announced from the farmers. The water allocations are affected not only by the 
water prices but also by the sale of hydroelectricity generated by water released to the 
downstream. The amounts of water allocated affect the farmers’ land allocation for the crops, 
since the two crops have different water requirements and different prices in the markets. At 
the two markets, the prices of the products are determined by the total amounts of commodities 





This study analyzes the interdependency of the decisions and models the decision process 
as a three-stage Stackelberg game. At the first stage, the amount of water released to farmers 
depends not only on their own quote of the water price, but also on the water price quoted by 
the competitor. So, there is a Bertrand game between the downstream farmer and the upstream 
farmer for water allocation. At the third stage, since the revenues from the sales of corn and 
switchgrass by farmers are determined not only by their decisions on the crops’ production 
amounts, but also by the market prices of the commodities, we have a Cournot game at both 
the corn market and the switchgrass market. Since we have a sequence of decision-making 
throughout the three stages, where decisions in a stage affect decisions in the following stages, 
we have a leader-follower Stackelberg game.  
In this game, the decisions at each stage affect the decisions of other stages in a cyclic 
feedback structure. The farmers’ decisions on the water prices (𝑝𝑑, 𝑝𝑢) in the first stage affect 
the utility company’s decisions on water allocation (𝑤𝑑, 𝑤𝑢) in the second stage. The utility 




𝑠 ) in the 
third stage. Then, the water allocation in the second stage and the land allocation in the third 
stage affect the farmers’ decisions on water prices in the first stage. In this decision cycle, 





In the model, we assume that the farmers’ land sizes are big enough so that they can 
consume any amount of water allocated by the utility company based on their quoted water 
prices. If the farmers are small and the utility company has enough water to meet the demands 
of the farmers, there will be no game between the farmers for water; in such as case only the 
Cournot competition exists at the corn market and the switchgrass market.  
Due to the societal benefits of cellulosic bioethanol, the government subsidizes the energy 
crop (switchgrass) production rather than the food crop (corn) production in the BSC. Because 
the government subsidies affect the decisions of the firms in the BSC, we consider the subsidies 
in the model. In the model, the government is not a player in the game, but an entity that sets 
the condition of the game environment before the game begins.  
Farmers are willing to produce corn rather than switchgrass, since corn supply chains are 
well developed, contrary to the only recently currently emerging switchgrass supply chains. 
Since the government should consider not only energy security but also food security, the 
amounts of the subsidies are determined to prevent the corn market and the switchgrass market 
from disappearing or becoming monopolistic markets. We assume that the government decides 





because consumer surplus and social welfare under duopoly would be higher than those under 
monopoly. 
 The decision variables and parameters are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 
Table 1. Decision variables 
Decision Variables Unit 
𝑝𝑑 Water price the downstream farmer offers to the utility company $/gal 
𝑝𝑢 Water price the upstream farmer offers to the utility company $/gal 
𝑤𝑑 Water quantity the utility company allocates to the downstream farmer gal 
𝑤𝑢 Water quantity the utility company allocates to the upstream farmer gal 
𝑞𝑑
𝑐  Land area of the downstream farmer for corn production  ha 
𝑞𝑑
𝑠  Land area of the downstream farmer for switchgrass production ha 
𝑞𝑢
𝑐  Land area of the upstream farmer for corn production ha 
𝑞𝑢
𝑠  Land area of the upstream farmer for switchgrass production ha 
 
Table 2. Parameters 
Parameters Unit 
𝑤 Water capacity of the utility company gal 





𝛼𝑠 Amount of switchgrass grown in unit land  t/ha 
𝛼𝑒 Amount of hydroelectricity generated by release of unit water kWh/gal 
𝑝𝑒 Price of the hydroelectricity at an electricity market  $/kWh 
𝑐𝑐 Cost of corn production $/t 
𝑐𝑠 Cost of switchgrass production $/t 
𝑐𝑤 Cost of processing water supply  $/gal2 
𝛿𝑐 Water requirement per unit land for corn production gal/ha 
𝛿𝑠 Water requirement per unit land for switchgrass production  gal/ha 
𝑎𝑐 Reservation price at a corn market $/t 
𝑏𝑐 Marginal price per unit quantity at a corn market $/t2 
𝑎𝑠 Reservation price at a switchgrass market $/t 
𝑏𝑠 Marginal price per unit quantity at a switchgrass market $/t2 
𝑃𝑐(∙) Inverse demand function at a corn market $/t 
𝑃𝑠(∙) Inverse demand function at a switchgrass market $/t 
𝑠𝑑 Subsidy to the downstream farmer for switchgrass production  $/ha 







3.2. Mathematical Model 
In this section, we introduce the objective functions, constraints, and decision variables of 
the players in the three stages of the decision process in the BSC. The farmers are leaders in 
the first stage and followers in the third stage: they decide water prices, 𝑝𝑑 and 𝑝𝑢, in the first 
stage, and land allocation for crop production, 𝑞𝑑
𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 , 𝑞𝑢
𝑐 , and 𝑞𝑢
𝑠 , in the third stage. The utility 
company is a follower and decides water allocation, 𝑤𝑑 and 𝑤𝑢, in the second stage.  
We find the equilibrium of the farmers’ decisions in the first stage and the third stage, and 
the utility company’s decision in the second stage by the backward induction procedure using 
their best response (BR) functions. First, we derive the best responses of the farmers through 
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of their problems for the decision variables of the third 
stage. Second, we derive the best response of the utility company through KKT conditions of 
its problems for the decision variables of the second stage. Third, we derive leaders’ optimal 
decisions through KKT conditions of their problems for the decision variables of the first stage.  
In this section, the backward induction solution process is followed in this order:  
(1) We derive the best responses of the farmers in the third stage.  





(3) We derive the optimal decision of the farmers in the first stage by using the utility 
company’s best responses in the second stage and the farmers’ best responses in the third 
stage. 
(4) Then, we find the equilibrium of the farmers and the utility company by substituting 
the optimal decisions in the first stage into the best responses in the second and third 
stages.  
 
3.2.1. Farmers’ decision on land use in the third stage  
In this section, we introduce the objective functions of the downstream and upstream 
farmers that maximize their own profits through their best decisions on land allocation, 
(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ) and (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ) respectively. The water capacity constraints are also introduced. In this 
third stage, the farmers make their best responses for land allocation based on the decision of 
the utility company on water allocation (𝑤𝑑, 𝑤𝑢)  in the second stage and each other’s 





All parameters in the model are strictly positive. However, water allocation (𝑤𝑑, 𝑤𝑢) 





the water allocation in the third stage: Case [1] 𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0; Case [2] 𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0; 
Case [3] 𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0; and Case [4] 𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0. The best responses for these cases of 
this third stage subgame are derived below and summarized in Table 3 and the derivation is 
presented in Appendix A. It is assumed that the parameter values meet the non-negativity 




𝑠 ) and two shadow prices (𝜆1, 𝜆4) shown in the 
second column of Table 3.   
 
3.2.1.1. Best response for Case [1] (𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0) 





𝑠 = 0), since the farmers cannot utilize water (𝑤𝑑 = 𝑤𝑢 = 0). They do 
not make profit (𝜋𝑑 = 𝜋𝑢 = 0).  
 
3.2.1.2. Best response for Case [2] (𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0) 
(1) Formulation  









𝜋𝑑 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )]𝛼𝑐𝑞𝑑




𝑐     
−𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠𝑞𝑑
𝑠 + 𝑠𝑑𝑞𝑑
𝑠 − 𝑤𝑑𝑝𝑑             (1) 
𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑑
𝑐 + 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ≤ 𝑤𝑑   (𝜆1)    water capacity constraint   (2) 
𝑞𝑑
𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ≥ 0    (𝜆2, 𝜆3)   non-negativity constraints   (3,4) 





𝜋𝑢 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )]𝛼𝑐𝑞𝑢




𝑐    
−𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠𝑞𝑢
𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢𝑞𝑢
𝑠 − 𝑤𝑢𝑝𝑢             (5) 
𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑐 + 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ≤ 𝑤𝑢   (𝜆4)    water capacity constraint   (6) 
𝑞𝑑
𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ≥ 0    (𝜆5, 𝜆6)   non-negativity constraints         (7,8) 
 In Equation (1) and Equation (5), the first two terms are the farmers’ revenues from the 
corn market and the switchgrass market, respectively. The next two terms are the costs of crop 
production. The last two terms are the government subsidy for the switchgrass production and 
cost of water purchased from the utility company. In Equations (2) – (4) and (6) – (8), 𝜆s’ are 






(2) KKT condition 
Now, we use KKT conditions to derive the best responses of the downstream farmer and the 
upstream farmer in the third stage. The KKT conditions of the problems are as follows:  
For the downstream farmer,   
ℒ1 = 𝜋𝑑 + 𝜆1(𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑑
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ) + 𝜆2𝑞𝑑
𝑐 + 𝜆3𝑞𝑑
𝑠          (9) 
𝜕ℒ1
𝜕𝑞𝑑
𝑐 = (𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝑞𝑢
𝑐 ) − 2𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝑞𝑑
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐𝜆1 + 𝜆2 = 0      (10) 
𝜕ℒ1
𝜕𝑞𝑑
𝑠 = (𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝑞𝑢
𝑠 + 𝑠𝑑) − 2𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝑞𝑑
𝑠 − 𝛿𝑠𝜆1 + 𝜆3 = 0     (11) 
0 ≤ 𝜆1 ⊥ [𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑑
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ] ≥ 0           (12) 
0 ≤ 𝜆2 ⊥ [𝑞𝑑
𝑐 ] ≥ 0               (13) 
0 ≤ 𝜆3 ⊥ [𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ] ≥ 0,               (14) 
and, for the upstream farmer,                 
ℒ2 = 𝜋𝑢 + 𝜆4(𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ) + 𝜆5𝑞𝑢
𝑐 + 𝜆6𝑞𝑢
𝑠         (15) 
𝜕ℒ2
𝜕𝑞𝑢
𝑐 = (𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝑞𝑑
𝑐 ) − 2𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝑞𝑢
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑐𝜆4 + 𝜆5 = 0      (16) 
𝜕ℒ2
𝜕𝑞𝑢
𝑠 = (𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝑞𝑑
𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢) − 2𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝑞𝑢
𝑠 − 𝛿𝑠𝜆4 + 𝜆6 = 0     (17) 
0 ≤ 𝜆4 ⊥ [𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑢





0 ≤ 𝜆5 ⊥ [𝑞𝑢
𝑐 ] ≥ 0               (19) 
0 ≤ 𝜆6 ⊥ [𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ] ≥ 0               (20) 
 
(3) Best response 
Because the lands of the farmers are large, the farmers consume all the water allocated to 
them by the utility company, and the water capacity constraints of the farmers are binding. So, 
from the complementary slack conditions of the KKT conditions of the water capacity 
constraints shown above, we have [𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑑
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ] = 0, [𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ] = 0, 𝜆1 ≥
0, and 𝜆4 ≥ 0.  
The downstream and upstream farmers’ land allocations for both corn and switchgrass are 
equal to or greater than zero (𝑞𝑑
𝑐 > 0, 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 > 0, 𝑞𝑢
𝑐 > 0, 𝑞𝑢
𝑠 > 0). So, we assume 𝜆2 = 0, 𝜆3 =
0, 𝜆5 = 0, and 𝜆6 = 0 . In summary, we have these conditions in Case [2]: 𝜆1 ≥ 0, 𝜆2 =
0, 𝜆3 = 0, 𝜆4 ≥ 0, 𝜆5 = 0, and 𝜆6 = 0.   







3.2.1.3. Best response for Case [3] 𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0 
(1) Formulation  
In this case, the downstream farmer does not produce any crop (𝑞𝑑
𝑐 = 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 = 0), since the 
downstream farmer cannot utilize water (𝑤𝑑 = 0). Also, the downstream farmer does not 
make profit (𝜋𝑑 = 0). In this case, the corn market and the switchgrass market are monopoly 
markets of the upstream farmer without competition. The objective function and the constraints 





𝜋𝑢 = (𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝛼𝑐𝑞𝑢





𝑠 − 𝑤𝑢𝑝𝑢 (5’) 
𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑐 + 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ≤ 𝑤𝑢   (𝜆4)    water capacity constraint   (6’) 
𝑞𝑢
𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ≥ 0    (𝜆5, 𝜆6)   non-negativity constraints     (7’,8’) 
 
(2) KKT condition 
Now, we use KKT conditions to derive the best responses of the upstream farmer in the third 
stage. The KKT conditions of the problems are as follows:  
ℒ2′ = 𝜋𝑢 + 𝜆4(𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ) + 𝜆5𝑞𝑢
𝑐 + 𝜆6𝑞𝑢








𝑐 = (𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 2𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝑞𝑢




𝑠 = (𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢) − 2𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝑞𝑢
𝑠 − 𝛿𝑠𝜆4 + 𝜆6 = 0       (23) 
0 ≤ 𝜆4 ⊥ [𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ] ≥ 0           (24) 
0 ≤ 𝜆5 ⊥ [𝑞𝑢
𝑐 ] ≥ 0               (25) 
0 ≤ 𝜆6 ⊥ [𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ] ≥ 0               (26) 
 
(3) Best response 
Because the land of the upstream farmer is large, the upstream farmer consumes all the 
water allocated by the utility company, and the water capacity constraint of the farmer is 
binding. So, from the complementary slack conditions of the KKT conditions of the water 
capacity constraint shown above, we have [𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑢
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ] = 0 and 𝜆4 ≥ 0.  
The upstream farmer’s land allocations for both corn and switchgrass are equal to or 
greater than zero (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 > 0, 𝑞𝑢
𝑠 > 0). So, we assume 𝜆5 = 0, and 𝜆6 = 0. In summary, we have 
these conditions in Case [3]: 𝜆4 ≥ 0, 𝜆5 = 0, and 𝜆6 = 0.  







3.2.1.4. Best response for Case [4] 𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0 
(1) Formulation 
In this case, the upstream farmer does not produce any crop (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 = 𝑞𝑢
𝑐 = 0), since the 
farmer cannot utilize water (𝑤𝑢 = 0). Also, the upstream farmer does not make profit (𝜋𝑢 =
0). In this case, the corn market and the switchgrass market are monopoly markets of the 
downstream farmer without competition. The objective function and the constraints of the 





𝜋𝑑 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐𝑞𝑑
𝑐 ]𝛼𝑐𝑞𝑑





𝑠 − 𝑤𝑑𝑝𝑑 (1’) 
𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑑
𝑐 + 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ≤ 𝑤𝑑   (𝜆1)    water capacity constraint    (2’) 
𝑞𝑑
𝑐 , 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ≥ 0    (𝜆2, 𝜆3)   non-negativity constraints       (3’,4’) 
 
(2) KKT condition 
Now, we use KKT conditions to derive the best responses of the downstream farmer in the 





ℒ1′ = 𝜋𝑑 + 𝜆1(𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑑
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ) + 𝜆2𝑞𝑑
𝑐 + 𝜆3𝑞𝑑




𝑐 = (𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 2𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝑞𝑑




𝑠 = (𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 + 𝑠𝑑) − 2𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝑞𝑑
𝑠 − 𝛿𝑠𝜆1 + 𝜆3 = 0       (29) 
0 ≤ 𝜆1 ⊥ [𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑑
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ] ≥ 0           (30) 
0 ≤ 𝜆2 ⊥ [𝑞𝑑
𝑐 ] ≥ 0               (31) 
0 ≤ 𝜆3 ⊥ [𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ] ≥ 0               (32) 
 
(3) Best response 
Because the land of the downstream farmer is large, the downstream farmer consumes all 
the water allocated by the utility company, and the water capacity constraint of the farmer is 
binding. So, from the complementary slack conditions of the KKT conditions of the water 
capacity constraint shown above, we have [𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐𝑞𝑑
𝑐 − 𝛿𝑠𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ] = 0 and 𝜆1 ≥ 0.  
The downstream farmer’s land allocations for both corn and switchgrass are equal to or 
greater than zero (𝑞𝑑
𝑐 > 0, 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 > 0). So, we assume 𝜆2 = 0, and 𝜆3 = 0. In summary, we have 
these conditions in case [4]: 𝜆1 ≥ 0, 𝜆2 = 0, and 𝜆3 = 0. These conditions are used to solve 






3.2.1.3. Solution  
From the subgame, we obtain the farmers’ best response in the third stage towards the 
utility company’s decision in the second stage. Cases with the conditions of water allocation, 
and the farmers’ best responses and profits are shown in Table 3. The calculation and the proof 
of Table 3 are shown in Appendix A. 
 
Table 3. Cases with conditions of water allocation, and the farmers’ best responses and profits in the third stage 
Case Condition 
Best Response and Profits of the Farmers in the Third Stage 
(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 , (𝑞𝑑
𝑠)𝐵𝑅 , (𝑞𝑢
𝑐)𝐵𝑅 , (𝑞𝑢
𝑠)𝐵𝑅 , 𝜋𝑑 , 𝜋𝑢 
[1] 
𝑤𝑑 = 0 
𝑤𝑢 = 0 
(𝑞𝑑
𝑐)𝐵𝑅 = 0 
(𝑞𝑑
𝑠)𝐵𝑅 = 0 
(𝑞𝑢
𝑐)𝐵𝑅 = 0 
(𝑞𝑢
𝑠)𝐵𝑅 = 0 
𝜋𝑑 = 0 
𝜋𝑢 = 0 
  [2] 
𝑤𝑑 > 0 
𝑤𝑢 > 0 
𝜆1 > 0 
𝜆2 = 0 
𝜆3 = 0 

































𝜆5 = 0 
































> 0  
𝜋𝑑 = [𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2{(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅}](𝑞𝑑
𝑐)𝐵𝑅 
𝜋𝑑 = +[𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2{(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅}](𝑞𝑢
𝑠)𝐵𝑅 + 𝑠𝑑(𝑞𝑢
𝑠)𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑑𝑝𝑑 





𝜋𝑑 = +[𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2{(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅}](𝑞𝑢
𝑠)𝐵𝑅 + 𝑠𝑢(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑢𝑝𝑢 
[3] 
𝑤𝑑 = 0 
𝑤𝑢 > 0 
𝜆4 > 0 
𝜆5 = 0 
𝜆6 = 0 
(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 = 0 
(𝑞𝑑






























> 0  
𝜋𝑑 = 0 
𝜋𝑢 = [𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2(𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅](𝑞𝑢





𝑠)𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑢𝑝𝑢 
[4] 
𝑤𝑑 > 0 
𝑤𝑢 = 0 
𝜆1 > 0 
𝜆2 = 0 




















≥ 0  
(𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 = 0 
(𝑞𝑢















> 0  
𝜋𝑑 = [𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2(𝑞𝑑
𝑐)𝐵𝑅](𝑞𝑑





𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑑𝑝𝑑  
𝜋𝑢 = 0 
 
In Case [2], the best responses of the farmers’ land use are feasible only when the 
government subsidies meet following conditions. 
2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ≥
𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝛿𝑐




2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢 ≤
𝛿𝑠




−𝑠𝑑 + 2𝑠𝑢 ≥
𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝛿𝑐




−𝑠𝑑 + 2𝑠𝑢 ≤
𝛿𝑠







2(2𝑤𝑑 + 𝑤𝑢) − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠







2(𝑤𝑑 + 2𝑤𝑢) − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠




In Case [3], the best responses of the farmers’ land use are feasible only when the 













𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝛿𝑐












In Case [4], the best responses of the farmers’ land use are feasible only when the 
government subsidies meet following conditions. 
𝑠𝑑 ≤
𝛿𝑠





𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝛿𝑐














 We analyze the effect of the utility company’s water allocation (𝑤𝑑, 𝑤𝑢) in the second 




𝑠 ) in the third stage. The best response of 
the farmers could be derived from the KKT conditions of their profit functions. In Case [1], 
Case [3], and Case [4], the land allocation is determined as a given value and not as a function 





case [1], [3], and [4], where the company either allocates all the water to a single farmer or 
does not allocate water to any farmer. Hence, we could analyze Case [2] with the effect of the 
water allocation. 
 
Corollary 1. If the farmers’ land capacity is enough to utilize all the water they purchase and 
the utility company allocates water to both farmers in Case [2] (𝑤𝑑 ≥ 0, 𝑤𝑢 ≥ 0) , the 
following holds for the effect of the utility company’s decision in the second stage on the 





















































Proof is shown in Appendix B. 
Corollary 1 reveals the reaction of the farmers to the utility company’s decision, as 
(𝑤𝑑)
𝐵𝑅 and (𝑤𝑢)
𝐵𝑅 . (2,3) The land allocation of the downstream farmer is not directly 
affected by the water allocation to the upstream farmer, and vice versa. (1,4) The farmers would 
use more land to produce both corn and switchgrass in case of higher water allocation to them. 












 for both farmers. The meaning of the coefficients is division of the marginal 
crop market price per unit land use for the corresponding crop (𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2 and 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2) by the water 
requirement of the crop per unit land (𝛿𝑠 and 𝛿𝑐), of the switchgrass and the corn respectively. 
 
3.2.2. Utility company’s decision on water allocation in the second stage 
Here, we introduce the objective function of the utility company that maximizes its profit 
through its best decisions on water allocation (𝑤𝑑, 𝑤𝑢) in the second stage. The constraints of 
water capacity and non-negativity of the decision variables used in the second stage are also 
introduced. In the second stage, the company makes its best response for water allocation 
(𝑤𝑑, 𝑤𝑢), based on the decision of the farmers in the first stage.  
 
3.2.2.1. Formulation 




𝜋ℎ = 𝑝𝑑𝒘𝒅 + 𝑝𝑢𝒘𝒖 − 𝑐𝑤[(𝒘𝒅)
2 + (𝒘𝒖)
2] + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒𝒘𝒅      (33) 





𝒘𝒅, 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0    (𝜆8, 𝜆9)   non-negativity constraints    (35,36) 
In Equation (33), the first two terms are revenue from sale of water to the downstream 
farmer and the upstream farmer, respectively. The third term is cost of crop production, and 
the last term is revenue from the sale of hydroelectricity generated by water release from the 
dam, at an electricity market. In equations (34) – (36), 𝜆s are KKT multipliers or the shadow 
price of the constraints. 
 
3.2.2.2. KKT Conditions 
Best responses of the utility company in the second stage could be derived by using the 
KKT conditions of the utility company’s problem as follows:  
ℒ3 = 𝜋ℎ + 𝜆7(𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖) + 𝜆8𝒘𝒅 + 𝜆9𝒘𝒖         (37)  
𝜕ℒ3
𝜕𝒘𝒅
= 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆8 = 0          (38)  
𝜕ℒ3
𝜕𝒘𝒖
= 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆9 = 0           (39)  
0 ≤ 𝜆7 ⊥ [𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖] ≥ 0            (40) 





0 ≤ 𝜆9 ⊥ [𝒘𝒖] ≥ 0               (42) 
 
3.2.2.3. Solution 
From the subgame, we obtain four domains, as shown in Figure 2 and Table 4, where the 
best response (BR) function of the company exists with five borders including x-axis and y-
axis. The derivation of the best responses and the border lines are shown in Appendix B. 
 
 








Table 4. Best responses of the utility company and their conditions in the second stage 
 
Domain 𝜆7, 𝜆8, 𝜆9 Conditions 





(𝜆7, 𝜆8, 𝜆9) 
Profit of the Utility Company (𝜋ℎ) 
[1] 
𝜆7 = 0 
𝜆8 = 0 
𝜆9 = 0 
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 ≥ 0 



















𝜆7 > 0 
𝜆8 = 0 
𝜆9 = 0 
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
𝑤𝑑
𝐵𝑅 =



















𝜆7 > 0 
𝜆8 > 0 
𝜆9 = 0 
𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤𝑤  
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 < −2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
𝑤𝑑
𝐵𝑅 = 0 
𝑤𝑢
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑤 > 0 
𝜆7 = 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 




𝜆7 > 0 
𝜆8 = 0 
𝜆9 > 0 
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 > 2𝑐𝑤𝑤  
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
𝑤𝑑
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑤 > 0 
𝑤𝑢
𝐵𝑅 = 0 
𝜆7 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
𝜆9 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
𝑤𝑝𝑑 − 𝑐𝑤𝑤
2 
• Domain [1] and Domain [2] result in Case [2] (𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0) in the third stage. 
• Domain [3] results in Case [3] (𝑤𝑑 = 0, 𝑤𝑢 > 0) in the third stage. 
• Domain [4] results in Case [4] (𝑤𝑑 > 0, 𝑤𝑢 = 0) in the third stage. 
• All the parameters used in Table 4 are strong positive. 








Domain [1] result in Case [2] of the best responses of the farmers in the third stage under 
the conditions of 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤𝑤. In this domain, the utility company utilizes its 
entire water capacity only if the sum of the prices per unit water from the farmers (𝑝𝑑, 𝑝𝑢) and 
the revenue from sale of hydroelectricity per unit water (𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒) is equal to the marginal cost of 
supplying all the water to a single farmer (2𝑐𝑤𝑤) . In other words, the utility company 
completely utilizes its entire water to allocate to the farmers under the condition 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 +
𝑝𝑢 = 2𝑐𝑤𝑤. Otherwise, when the sum of the prices and the revenue is less than the marginal 
cost under a condition of 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 < 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 , and the utility company does not 
completely allocate all of its water to the farmers. The farmers receive as much water as they 
want without competition against each other in the second stage. This case implies that the 
farmers do not compete on water price under a game in the first stage. 
Domain [2] can results in a case among Case [2], Case [3], and Case [4] of the best 
responses of the farmers in the third stage under the conditions of 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒, 
𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑢 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 , and 𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 . In Domain [2], the downstream 
farmer and the upstream farmer would produce both crops (𝑞𝑑
𝑐 + 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 ≥ 0, 𝑞𝑢
𝑐 + 𝑞𝑢
𝑠 ≥ 0) in the 
third stage, since the utility company allocates water to both farmers (𝑤𝑑
𝐵𝑅 > 0, 𝑤𝑢
𝐵𝑅 > 0) in 





Domains [3] and [4] result in cases [3] and [4] respectively of the best responses of the 
farmers in the third stage. In Domain [3], the downstream farmer cannot cultivate any crop 
(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 = 𝑞𝑑
𝑠 = 0) to make profit (𝜋𝑑 = 0) in the third stage, since the utility company does not 
allocate water to the downstream farmer (𝑤𝑑
𝐵𝑅 = 0, 𝑤𝑢
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑤) under the condition of 𝑝𝑑 −
𝑝𝑢 < −2𝑐𝑤𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒,  in the second stage. On the other hand, in Domain [4], the upstream 
farmer cannot cultivate any crop (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 = 𝑞𝑢
𝑠 = 0) to make profit (𝜋𝑢 = 0) in the third stage, 
since the utility company does not allocate water to the upstream farmer (𝑤𝑑
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑤, 𝑤𝑢
𝐵𝑅 = 0) 
under the condition of 𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 in the second stage.  
Among all possible solutions of the above problem, we are interested only in the cases 
where additional water capacity of the dam increases the profit of the utility company, i.e., 
when 𝜆7 > 0. In this case, the water capacity constraint of the utility company becomes binding. 
Domains [2], [3], and [4] belong to this case whereas Domain [1] does not belong to this case. 
If the water capacity constraint is not binding, with there being enough water to meet the 
demand, the price competition between the farmers does not occur.  
In domains [2], [3], and [4], we could analyze the result of a Bertrand game between the 
downstream farmers and the upstream farmers toward price-bidding for water allocation. In 





company after the competitive bidding. On the other hand, in domains [3] and [4], one of the 
farmers takes all the water from the utility company after winning the bidding against the other 
farmer. The upstream farmer and the downstream farmer are the winner in Domain [3] and 
Domain [4], respectively. 
 
3.2.2.4. Analysis 
 We analyze the effect of the farmers’ decision regarding water prices (𝑝𝑑, 𝑝𝑢) in the first 
stage on the utility company’s water allocation (𝑤𝑑, 𝑤𝑢) in the second stage. The best response 
of the company could be derived from the KKT conditions. In domains [3] and [4], the water 
allocation to each farmer is 𝑤 or 0, and not a function of the water prices from the farmers. 
The water allocation is not affected by the water prices in domains [3] and [4], where the utility 
company allocates all the water to only one of the farmers. Hence, we analyze Domain [2] with 






Corollary 2. If the farmers’ land capacity is enough to utilize the water that they purchase from 
the utility company in Domain [2], the following holds for the effect of the farmers’ decisions 

















< 0   
Proof is shown in Appendix D. 
Corollary 2 reveals the reaction of the utility company, 𝑤𝑑
𝐵𝑅 and 𝑤𝑢
𝐵𝑅, in the second stage 
to the farmers’ decision, 𝑝𝑑 and 𝑝𝑢, in the first stage. The company would allocate more water 
to a farmer when that farmer is offering a higher price. Consequently, announcement of a higher 
price offer by one farmer decreases the water allocation to each other. 
 
3.2.3. Farmers’ decision on bidding water price in the first stage 
In this subsection, we introduce the objective functions of the downstream farmer and the 
upstream farmer that maximize their own profits through their best decisions on the water price 
(𝑝𝑑)  and (𝑝𝑢)  respectively, in the first stage. Non-negativity constraints of the decision 





We also find equilibrium of the supply chain’s decision through the best decision of the 
farmers in the first stage, the best response of the utility company in the second stage, and the 
best responses of the farmers in the third stage.  
In the first stage, the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer compete in water price 
under a Bertrand game. After the bidding competition, the farmers share the water from the 
utility company or one of the farmers takes all the water after winning the bidding. Both farmers 
make their decisions on water price in the belief that the corn market and the switchgrass market 
are duopolistic rather than monopolistic, since each farmer believes that the other may want to 
sell both corn and switchgrass at each market. After the farmers announce their water prices to 
the utility company in the first stage, the company decides the water allocation. In the price-
bidding competition, the result shows that the farmers share water (Domain [1] and Domain [2] 
of the second stage), the downstream farmer is a winner of the bidding and takes all the water 
(Domain [3] of the second stage) or the upstream farmer is a winner of the bidding and takes 







In the first stage, the farmers make their best decisions for water prices (𝑝𝑑, 𝑝𝑢) by using 
the best responses of the utility company in the second stage and of the farmers in the third 
stage. The objective function and the constraint of the farmers in the first stage are formulated 
as follows: 
For the downstream farmer, 
max
𝒑𝒅
𝜋𝑑 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐{(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅}]𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑑




𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + 𝑠𝑑(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑑
𝐵𝑅𝒑𝒅  (43) 
𝒑𝒅 ≥ 0     (𝜆10)   non-negativity constraint   (44) 
and, for the upstream farmer, 
max
𝒑𝒖
𝜋𝑢 = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐{(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅}]𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑢




𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 + 𝑠𝑢(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝐵𝑅 − 𝑤𝑢
𝐵𝑅𝒑𝒖  (45) 
𝒑𝒖 ≥ 0     (𝜆11)   non-negativity constraint   (46) 
 
Then, we reformulate the above problems in each scenario into their KKT conditions to 
derive the best responses of the players in the problems of the downstream farmer and the 






3.2.3.2. KKT Conditions 
Best responses of the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer in the third stage could 
be derived by using the KKT conditions of its problems as follows:  
For the downstream farmer’s problem, 
ℒ4 = 𝜋𝑑 + 𝜆10𝑝𝑑               (47) 
𝜕ℒ4
𝜕𝑝𝑑















































𝑝𝑑 + 𝜆10 = 0 (48) 
0 ≤ 𝜆10 ⊥ [𝑝𝑑] ≥ 0              (49) 
and, for the upstream farmer’s problem, 
ℒ5 = 𝜋𝑢 + 𝜆11𝑝𝑢               (50) 
𝜕ℒ5
𝜕𝑝𝑢















































𝑝𝑢 + 𝜆11 = 0 (51) 





From the above problems converted to their KKT conditions, we could find Nash 
equilibrium of the Cournot competition game between the downstream farmer and the upstream 
farmer by putting their KKT conditions, equations (48), (49), (51), and (52), together. 
  



















𝑝𝑑 + 𝜆10 = 0             (53) 
𝜆10[𝑝𝑑] = 0                (54) 
𝑝𝑑 ≥ 0                 (55) 


















𝑝𝑢 + 𝜆11 = 0              (56) 
𝜆11[𝑝𝒖] = 0                (57) 
𝑝𝑢 ≥ 0                 (58) 
 
The downstream and upstream farmers’ water price bids to the utility company are greater 





price. So, we assume that Equation (55) and Equation (58) are not binding, and 𝜆10 =
0 and 𝜆11 = 0.  
 
3.2.3.3. Solution 
The Nash equilibrium of the farmers’ decisions in the first stage could be derived from the 
KKT conditions.  
 
Proposition 1. Through the farmers’ best responses in the third stage and the utility company’s 
best response in the second stage, Nash equilibrium of the decisions of the farmers in the first 
stage is as follows: 
(1) 𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 = 𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 +
2𝐵𝑑+𝐵𝑢−𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒
3
     
(2) 𝑝𝑢

































The calculation and the proof of deriving the Nash equilibrium for Proposition 1 are shown in 
Appendix E. 
 
3.2.4. Nash equilibrium of the farmers’ and the utility company’s decisions in the BSC 
We derive the equilibria of the farmers’ and the utility company’s decisions by substituting 
the best responses. 
 After the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer decide their water prices, the utility 
company makes a decision on water allocation based on the prices. The farmers’ best decisions 
in the first stage result in one of the four domains in the second stage: Domain [1], Domain [2], 
Domain [3], and Domain [4]. Among the four domains, we do not consider Domain [1], since 
this domain does not generate a competitive game in water prices between the farmers. 
Domain [2] happens in the second stage only if the farmers’ decisions on water prices meet 
the following Condition [2] which consists of three sub-conditions derived in the second stage: 








𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 > 2𝑐𝑤𝑤       (2-1) 
𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 − 𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤𝑤       (2-2) 
𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 − 𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤𝑤       (2-3) 
In Condition [2], sub-condition (2-1) presents that the utility company utilizes its entire 
water capacity and does not leave over its water since the revenue per unit water is greater than 
the marginal cost of supplying all the water. Moreover, sub-condition (2-2) and sub-condition 
(2-3) present that the utility company allocates its water to both downstream farmer and 
upstream farmer since the water prices from the farmers do not have significant difference in 
the second stage.  
Domain [3] happens in the second stage only if the farmers’ decisions on water prices meet 
the following Condition [3] derived in the second stage: 
Condition [3] 𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 − 𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 < −2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
Condition [2] presents that the utility company allocates all the water to the upstream 
farmer since the water price from the upstream farmer is significantly higher than that from the 
downstream farmer. So, the upstream farmer is a winner who takes all the water from the utility 





Domain [4] happens in the second stage only if the farmers’ decisions on water prices meet 
the following Condition [4] derived in the second stage: 
Condition [4] 𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 − 𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 > 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
Condition [4] presents that the utility company allocates all the water to the downstream 
farmer since the water price from the downstream farmer is significantly higher than that from 
the upstream farmer. So, the downstream farmer is a winner who takes all the water from the 
utility company in the price-bidding for water allocation in the second stage. 
 
Proposition 2-1. When 𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸  and 𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 meet Condition [2] of Domain [2], Nash equilibrium 
of the decisions of the utility company in the second stage and the farmers in the third stage, 
and their profits are as follows: 






























> 0  






















































> 0  

























(3) Profit of the farmers and the utility company: 
𝜋𝑑
[1] = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐{(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1}]𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠{(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 +
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1}]𝛼𝑠(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑠𝑑(𝑞𝑑




[1] = [(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2{(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1}](𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + [(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠) −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2{(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1}](𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑠𝑑(𝑞𝑑
𝑠)𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑤𝑑
𝑁𝐸1𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸   
𝜋𝑢
[1] = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐{(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1}]𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠{(𝑞𝑑




𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑠𝑢(𝑞𝑢








[1] = [(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2{(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1}](𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 + [(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠) −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2{(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + (𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1}](𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 + 𝑠𝑢(𝑞𝑢











The calculation and the proof of deriving the Nash equilibrium for Proposition 1-1 are shown 
in Appendix F.1. 
 
Proposition 2-2. When 𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸  and 𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 meet Condition [3] of Domain [3], Nash equilibrium 
of the decisions of the utility company in the second stage and the farmers in the third stage, 
and their profits are as follows: 
(1) Best decisions of the utility company in the second stage: 
(𝑤𝑑)
𝑁𝐸2 = 0     
(𝑤𝑢)
𝑁𝐸2 = 𝑤 > 0  
(2) Best decisions of the farmers in the third stage: 
(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 = 0  
(𝑞𝑑























> 0  
(3) Profit of the farmers and the utility company: 
𝜋𝑑
[2] = 0    
𝜋𝑢
[2] = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2]𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑢




𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 + 𝑠𝑢(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 − 𝑤𝑢
𝑁𝐸2𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸   
𝜋𝑢
[2] = [(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2(𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2](𝑞𝑢




𝑠 )𝑁𝐸2 + 𝑠𝑢(𝑞𝑢






















The calculation and the proof of deriving the Nash equilibrium for Proposition 1-2 are shown 






Proposition 2-3. When 𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸  and 𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 meet Condition [4] of Domain [4], Nash equilibrium 
of the decisions of the utility company in the second stage and the farmers in the third stage, 
and their profits are as follows: 
(1) Best decisions of the utility company in the second stage: 
(𝑤𝑑)
𝑁𝐸3 = 𝑤 > 0  
(𝑤𝑢)
𝑁𝐸3 = 0  



















> 0  
(𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0   
(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0  
(3) Profit of the farmers and the utility company: 
𝜋𝑑
[3] = [𝑎𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3]𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 + [𝑎𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3]𝛼𝑠(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 −
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 + 𝑠𝑑(𝑞𝑑








[3] = [(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3](𝑞𝑑




𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 + 𝑠𝑑(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 − 𝑤𝑑
𝑁𝐸3𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸   
𝜋𝑢

























The calculation and the proof of deriving the Nash equilibrium for Proposition 1-3 are shown 
in Appendix F.3. 
 
3.2.3.3. Analysis 
Depending on the government subsidy, the Nash equilibrium of the water prices (𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 ,
𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸) can meet one of Condition [2], Condition [3], and Condition [4] in the first stage. Then, 
based on the satisfied condition, the Nash equilibrium of the water allocation (𝑤𝑑
𝑁𝐸 , 𝑤𝑑
𝑁𝐸) is 





on the determined domain of the water allocation, the Nash equilibrium of the land uses is 
determined among Case [2], Case [3], and Case [4] in the third stage. In other words, when the 
Nash equilibrium of the water prices meets Conditions [2], the Nash equilibrium of the water 
allocation corresponds to Domain [2] and the Nash equilibrium of the land uses corresponds to 
Case [2], Case [3], or Case [4]. When the Nash equilibrium of the water prices meets Conditions 
[3], the Nash equilibrium of the water allocation corresponds to Domain [3] and the Nash 
equilibrium of the land uses corresponds to Case [3]. When the Nash equilibrium of the water 
prices meets Conditions [4], the Nash equilibrium of the water allocation corresponds to 
Domain [4] and the Nash equilibrium of the land uses corresponds to Case [4].  
In Chapter 4, we use the results in this chapter for a policy analysis to study the effect of 
the government subsidy on the decisions and outputs of the BSC. In the policy analysis, we 
consider that the Nash equilibrium of the water prices (𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 , 𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸) meets Condition [2] of 
Domain [2] since this case is the most representative case in our research. In this case, 
depending on the government subsidy, the downstream and upstream farmers may produce both 







4. POLICY ANALYSIS 
In Chapter 3, we presented mathematical models of the BSC, where two farmers purchase 
water from a utility company, produce two kinds of biomass, corn and switchgrass, and sell the 
crops at a corn market and a switchgrass market. We derived the best decisions of the farmers 
and the utility company at each stage and found the Nash equilibrium of the BSC. 
In this chapter, we analyze the effect of the government subsidy on the BSC, with the Nash 






𝑐 )𝑁𝐸 , (𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸 , (𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸 , (𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸)  which meets Condition [2] of Domain [2]. The 
government subsidy affects the decisions and profits of the downstream farmers, the upstream 
farmers and the utility company (𝜋𝑑 , 𝜋𝑢, and 𝜋ℎ), the producer surplus (𝑃𝑆𝜋), the consumer 
surplus (CS) in a corn market (𝐶𝑆𝑐) and a switchgrass market (𝐶𝑆𝑠), and total social welfare 
(𝑆𝑊) in the BSC. Producer surplus is the difference between the price the producers are willing 
to supply their product for and the actual price of the product at a market. Consumer surplus is 
the difference between the price consumers are willing to pay for a product and the actual price 
of the product at a market. At a market with a linear inverse demand function, 𝑃(𝑄) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄, 









expenditure (S𝑔𝑜𝑣) is the sum of the subsidies provided to the two farmers and is 𝑠𝑑𝑞𝑑
𝑐 + 𝑠𝑢𝑞𝑢
𝑐 . 
In a market analysis, economic welfare (social welfare) at an equilibrium is the sum of producer 
surplus and consumer surplus. In our model, we estimate economic performance of the subsidy 
policy through subtracting the government expenditure on the subsidy from the social welfare. 












  : Consumer surplus at a switchgrass market in the BSC 
S𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑠𝑑𝑞𝑑
𝑐 + 𝑠𝑢𝑞𝑢
𝑐   : Government expenditure on the subsidy 
𝑆𝑊 = 𝑃𝑆𝜋 + 𝐶𝑆𝑐 + 𝐶𝑆𝑠 : Social welfare in the BSC 
∆𝑆𝑊= 𝑆𝑊 − S𝑔𝑜𝑣  : Social welfare subtracted by the government expenditure 
In this research, we study two forms of subsidy policy to the two farmers: [1] Different 
amounts of subsidies per unit output quantity to the farmers (subsidy discrimination), [2] Equal 
amounts of subsidies per unit output quantity to the farmers (subsidy equalization). Subsidy 





Furthermore, we conduct a parametric analysis for the two forms of the subsidy policy by 
using realistic parameters from literature. The effect of the subsidy amount on the profits of the 
players and the social welfare subtracted by the government expenditure of the BSC is analyzed. 
We analyze efficiencies of the two subsidy forms under the same budget limit. The values used 
in the parameter analysis are shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Parameters values from literature reviews 
 Value Unit Source 
𝑝𝑒 0.010 $/kWh Uria-Martinez et al (2018) 
𝑐𝑤 3.5 × 10
−10 $/gal2 Wichelns (2010) 
𝛼𝑐 6-10 t/ha Liska et al. (2009), Pordesimo et al. (2004), U.S. Department of Energy (2011) 
𝛼𝑠 14-22 t/ha Spatari et al. (2005) 
𝑎𝑐 176 $/t Bai et al. (2012) 
𝑏𝑐 6.4 × 10
−5 $/t2 Bai et al. (2012) 
𝑐𝑐 76-88 $/t Purdue Crop Cost and Return Guide (2011), U.S. Department of Energy (2011) 
𝑐𝑠 38-48 $/t Kumar and Sokhansanj (2007), U.S. Department of Energy (2011)  
𝛿𝑐 1,260,100 gal/ha Hamilton et al. (2015) 





In addition to the data set in Table 5, we need more information about values of two 
parameters, 𝛼𝑒 and 𝑐𝑤. Since there are many hydroelectric dams with a range of properties, 
the amount of electricity generated varies much. Water flow, height of the dam, turbine 
efficiency, and other factors affect hydroelectricity generation. In case of the Hoover Dam, one 
cubic foot (7.48 gallon) of water falling 8.81 feet per second generates one horsepower (0.7457 
kilowatt) at 100 percent efficiency. Average head (the vertical distance water travels) the 
turbine operates at is 510 to 530 feet (Colorado River and Hoover Dam, 2017). For example, 
when a gallon of water falls 530 feet, it generates 6.00  kilowatt-seconds which can be 
approximately converted to 0.0017 kWh/gal (𝛼𝑒 = 1.7 ∙ 10
−3).   
Given the multiplicity of water rights, allocations, and contractual arrangements that 
characterize irrigation in the Unites States, there is considerable variation in the prices paid for 
irrigation water. Some farmers with riparian water rights or exchange agreements with the 
federal government receive water at very low cost [$5 to $10 per 1,000 m3(264,172 gallon)], 
while other farmers with less favorable contracts or those who purchase water from some state-
level irrigation agencies pay much higher prices ranging from $20 to more than $100 per 
1,000 m3  (Wichelns, 2010). The government is willing to charge $5 per 1,000 m3 , 





$3.5 ∙ 10−10/gal2. We assume this cost to be the water supply cost in our model (𝑐𝑤 = 3.5 ∙
10−10). 
In parameter analysis, we use the following parameters: 𝑝𝑒 = 0.01, 𝑐𝑤 = 3.5 ∙
10−10, 𝛼𝑐 = 10, 𝛼𝑠 = 22, 𝛼𝑒 = 1.7 ∙ 10
−3, 𝑎𝑐 = 176, 𝑏𝑐 = 6.4 ∙ 10
−5, 𝑐𝑐 = 76, 𝑐𝑠 = 48, 𝑐𝑤 =
3.5 ∙ 10−10, 𝛿𝑐 = 1,260,100, 𝛿𝑠 = 1,439,737, 𝑤 = 8 ∙ 10
5, 𝑎𝑠 = 180, 𝑏𝑠 = 8. 
 Moreover, for policy analysis in this chapter, we only consider a situation, where the utility 
company allocates its water to both farmer (Domain [2]) in the second stage, and the two 
farmers compete in both corn and switchgrass markets (Case [2]) in the third stage. The 
situation satisfies following conditions: 
(1) 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 ≥ 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
(2) 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
(3) 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 
(4) 𝛿𝑠
2(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠) + 3𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝛿𝑐𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) ≥ 0 
(5) −𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) + 𝛿𝑐
2(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠) + 3𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝛿𝑠𝑤𝑑 + 𝛿𝑐
2(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) ≥ 0 
(6) 𝛿𝑠
2(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠) + 3𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝛿𝑐𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(−𝑠𝑑 + 2𝑠𝑢) ≥ 0 
(7) −𝛿𝑐𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) + 𝛿𝑐
2(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠) + 3𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝛿𝑠𝑤𝑢 + 𝛿𝑐






2𝛿𝑐(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) + 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠) − 𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑐
2𝛼𝑠
2(2𝑤𝑑 + 𝑤𝑢) +
𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑑 ≥ 0 
(9) 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝛿𝑐(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) + 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝛿𝑠(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠) − 𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑐
2𝛼𝑠
2(𝑤𝑑 + 2𝑤𝑢) +
𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑢 ≥ 0 
Conditions (1 ~ 3) imply Domain [2] in the second stage and Conditions (4 ~ 9) imply Case 
[2] in the third stage. Through these conditions, we could find the effect of the government 
subsidy on the three-stage BSC with two duopolistic markets. These conditions are applied to 
Proposition 3, Proposition 4, Corollary 3, Corollary 4, Corollary 5, and Corollary 6, which we 
discuss throughout this chapter. 
 
4.1. Subsidy Discrimination 
In this section, we analyze the effect of the discriminated government subsidy on the BSC. 
The government makes the decision to provide different subsidies to recipients who have 
different conditions. The policymakers may like to consider discriminating the subsidies 
depending upon the recipients’ background and the holistic perspectives on the systems in order 





farmer may have an advantage, in that the utility company can earn additional profit from 
hydroelectricity generation by water release to the downstream.  
 
Corollary 3. If six times the supply cost per unit water from the utility company is greater than 
the revenue from sale of hydroelectricity generated by unit water (6𝑐𝑤𝑤 > 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒) , the 



























































The proof of Corollary 3 is shown in Appendix G. 
Corollary 3 reveals the reaction of the farmers and the utility company to the discriminated 
government subsidies per unit output quantity to the downstream farmer (𝑠𝑑) and the upstream 
farmer (𝑠𝑢). (1) The farmers would announce a higher price of water for more amounts of 
subsidies per unit output quantity. A farmer in particular would announce a higher price when 
subsidy to that farmer increases than when subsidy to the other farmer increases. (2) The utility 
company would increase water allocation to a farmer when subsidy to that farmer increases, 





increases. (3) A farmer would decrease corn production when subsidy to that farmer increases, 
whereas a farmer would increase corn production when subsidy to the other farmer increases. 
(4) On the other hand, a farmer would increase switchgrass production when subsidy to that 
farmer increases, whereas a farmer would decrease switchgrass production when subsidy to the 
other farmer increases. 
 
Proposition 3. Under the discriminated government subsidies to each farmer (𝑠𝑑 ≠ 𝑠𝑢), the 
Nash equilibrium of the BSC is as follows:  
For decision variables of the BSC, 
𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 = 1.769205591 ∙ 10−4 + 4.995691093 ∙ 10−13(2𝑠𝑑 + 𝑠𝑢)     
𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 = 2.902538925 ∙ 10−4 + 4.995691093 ∙ 10−13(𝑠𝑑 + 2𝑠𝑢)  
(𝑤𝑑)
𝑁𝐸1 = 4.404761904 ∙ 105 + 3.568350781 ∙ 10−4(𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢)  
(𝑤𝑢)
𝑁𝐸1 = 3.595238096 ∙ 105 − 3.568350781 ∙ 10−4(𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢)  
(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.762994846 ∙ 10−1 − 9.836019102 ∙ 10−5(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢)  
(𝑞𝑑






𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.120568006 ∙ 10−1 + 9.836019102 ∙ 10−5(𝑠𝑑 − 2𝑠𝑢)  
(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.516393456 ∙ 10−1 − 8.608796850 ∙ 10−5(𝑠𝑑 − 2𝑠𝑢)  
For outcomes of the BSC, 
𝜋𝑑 = 3.606615295 ∙ 10
2 + 2.869598951 ∙ 10−5(4𝑠𝑑
2 + 𝑠𝑢
2) + 1.010931575 ∙
10−1(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) − 1.147839580 ∙ 10
−4𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑢  
𝜋𝑢 = 2.699945523 ∙ 10
2 + 2.86959895 ∙ 10−5(𝑠𝑑
2 + 136𝑠𝑢
2) − 1.010930167 ∙
10−1(𝑠𝑑 − 35𝑠𝑢) − 2.008719264 ∙ 10
−3𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑢  
𝜋ℎ = 2.571634314 ∙ 10
2 + 1.782637822 ∙ 10−16(𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢)
2 + 6.399242400 ∙
10−7𝑠𝑑 + 5.590416224 ∙ 10
−7𝑠𝑢  
𝐶𝑆𝑐 = 3.2 ∙ 10
−5[2.883562852 − 9.836047418 ∙ 10−4(𝑠𝑑 + 𝑠𝑢)]
2  
𝐶𝑆𝑠 = 4 ∙ [6.672137826 + 1.893935307 ∙ 10
−3(𝑠𝑑 + 𝑠𝑢)]
2  
S𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 1.721759370 ∙ 10
−4(𝑠𝑑
2 + 𝑠𝑢
2 − 𝑠𝑑𝑠𝑢) + 1.516396465 ∙ 10
−1𝑠𝑑 +
1.516393456 ∙ 10−1𝑠𝑢  
∆𝑆𝑊= 1065.889472 − 1.43479947 ∙ 10
−5𝑠𝑑
2 + 3.773522620 ∙ 10−3𝑠𝑢
2 +







Proposition 3 reveals the effect of the subsidies on the BSC. We could analyze the 
decisions on water allocations of the utility company and the land allocations of the farmers.  
For the utility company’s water allocation, the utility company allocates the entire water 
to the upstream farmer with (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) ≤ −1.234397113 ∙ 10
9 , while the utility company 
allocates the entire water to the downstream farmer with (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) ≥ 1.007534941 ∙ 10
9. The 
utility company would allocate water to both the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer 
in case of −1.234397113 ∙ 109 < (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) < 1.007534941 ∙ 10
9.  
For the downstream farmer’s land allocation, the farmer produces only corn with 
(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) ≤ −1.761449935 ∙ 10
3 , while the farmer produces only switchgrass with 
(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) ≥ 1.792386562 ∙ 10
3 . The downstream farmer would produce both corn and 
switchgrass in case of −1.761449935 ∙ 103 < (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) < 1.792386562 ∙ 10
3.  
For the upstream farmer’s land allocation, the farmer produces only corn with 
(𝑠𝑑 − 2𝑠𝑢) ≥ 1.761446440 ∙ 10
3 , while the farmer produces only switchgrass with 
(𝑠𝑑 − 2𝑠𝑢) ≤ −1.139249522 ∙ 10
3 . The upstream farmer would produce both corn and 







Corollary 4. In the case of the discriminated government subsidy to the farmers, the following 
holds for the effect of the policies on the outcome of the supply chain: 
𝜕𝜋𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑑
= 2.021858750 ∙ 10−1 + 1.147839580 ∙ 10−4(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢)      
𝜕𝜋𝑑
𝜕𝑠𝑢
= −1.010931575 ∙ 10−1 − 1.147839580 ∙ 10−4(2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢)     
𝜕𝜋𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑑
= −1.010930167 ∙ 10−1 + 5.7391979 ∙ 10−5(𝑠𝑑 − 35𝑠𝑢)   
𝜕𝜋𝑢
𝜕𝑠𝑢
= 3.538251276 − 5.7391979 ∙ 10−5(35𝑠𝑑 − 136𝑠𝑢)      
𝜕𝜋ℎ
𝜕𝑠𝑑
= 6.399242400 ∙ 10−7 + 3.565275644 ∙ 10−16(𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢)      
𝜕𝜋ℎ
𝜕𝑠𝑢
= 5.590416224 ∙ 10−7 − 3.565275644 ∙ 10−16(𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢)      
𝜕∆𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝑠𝑑
= 5.05464494 ∙ 10−2 − 2.86959894 ∙ 10−5(𝑠𝑑 + 67𝑠𝑢)    
𝜕∆𝑆𝑊
𝜕𝑠𝑢
= 3.38661193 − 1.922631296 ∙ 10−3(𝑠𝑑 − 3.925373𝑠𝑢)     
 
Corollary 4 reveals the effect of the government subsidies on the profits of the players, and 
on the total social welfare in the BSC. We find that the effect has to do with the relation between 





Increasing 𝑠𝑑 in case of (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) > −1.761447144 ∙ 10
3 and increasing 𝑠𝑢 in case 
of (2𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) < −8.80725488 ∙ 10
2  would improve the downstream farmer’s profit. 
Increasing 𝑠𝑑  in case of (𝑠𝑑 − 35𝑠𝑢) > 1.76144852 ∙ 10
3  and increasing 𝑠𝑢  in case of 
(35𝑠𝑑 − 136𝑠𝑢) < 6.16506232 ∙ 10
4 would improve the upstream farmer’s profit. Increasing 
𝑠𝑑  in case of (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) > −1.79488013 ∙ 10
9 ,  and increasing 𝑠𝑢  in case of (𝑠𝑑 − 𝑠𝑢) <
1.56801795 ∙ 109  would improve the utility company’s profit. Increasing 𝑠𝑑  in case of 
(𝑠𝑑 + 67𝑠𝑢) < 1.76144648 ∙ 10
3  and increasing 𝑠𝑢  in case of (𝑠𝑑 − 3.925373𝑠𝑢) <
1.76144638 ∙ 103 would improve social welfare of the BSC. 
 
4.2. Subsidy Equalization 
In this section, we analyze the effect of equalized government subsidy on the BSC. The 
government makes the decision to provide equal subsidies to the recipients under subsidy 
equalization which is a special case of subsidy discrimination. Subsidy equalization could be 
considered when policy equity is prioritized over policy efficiency, or when the advantage of 
the discrimination is regarded as being insignificant. In this research, subsidy equalization could 





switchgrass) through identical technology. Note that, under this policy, if a farmer receives 
subsidy, the other farmer also receives the same amount of subsidy for the same output quantity. 
Here, we set 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑢 = 𝑠. 
 
Corollary 5. If six times the supply cost per unit water from the utility company is greater than 
the revenue from sale of hydroelectricity generated by unit water (6𝑐𝑤𝑤 > 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒) , the 































The proof of Corollary 5 is shown in Appendix H. 
Corollary 5 reveals the reaction of the farmers and the utility company to the equalized 
government subsidies to both farmers (𝑠). (1) The farmers would announce a higher price of 
water for more subsidies. (2) The change in value of the equalized subsidy does not affect the 
water allocation of the utility company to the farmers. (3,4) Both farmers produce less corn and 






Proposition 4. Under equalized government subsidies to both farmers (𝑠𝑑 = 𝑠𝑢 = 𝑠), the Nash 
equilibrium of the BSC is as follows:  
For decision variables of the BSC, 
𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 = 1.769205591 ∙ 10−4 + 1.498707328 ∙ 10−12𝑠     
𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 = 2.902538925 ∙ 10−4 + 1.498707328 ∙ 10−12𝑠  
(𝑤𝑑)
𝑁𝐸1 = 4.404761904 ∙ 105  
(𝑤𝑢)
𝑁𝐸1 = 3.595238096 ∙ 105  
(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.762994846 ∙ 10−1 − 9.836047419 ∙ 10−5𝑠  
(𝑞𝑑
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.516396465 ∙ 10−1 + 8.608796850 ∙ 10−5𝑠  
(𝑞𝑢
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.120568006 ∙ 10−1 − 9.836047419 ∙ 10−5𝑠  
(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸1 = 1.516393456 ∙ 10−1 + 8.608796850 ∙ 10−5𝑠  
For outcomes of the BSC, 
𝜋𝑑 = 3.606615295 ∙ 10
2 + 1.010927174 ∙ 10−1𝑠 + 2.86959895 ∙ 10−5𝑠2  
𝜋𝑢 = 2.699945523 ∙ 10





𝜋ℎ = 2.571634314 ∙ 10
2 + 1.198965862 ∙ 10−6𝑠  
𝐶𝑆𝑐 = 1.238372209 ∙ 10
−10(1465.813822 − 𝑠)2  
𝐶𝑆𝑠 = 5.739185516 ∙ 10
−7(1761.448187 + 𝑠)2  
S𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 1.721759370 ∙ 10
−4(s + 1761.448187)s  
∆𝑆𝑊= 1065.889472 + 3.437158379𝑠 + 1.836543328 ∙ 10
−3𝑠2   
 
Proposition 4 reveals the effect of equalized subsidy on the BSC. We can analyze the 
decisions on water allocation of the utility company and the land allocation of the farmers. Both 
the downstream farmer and the upstream farmer cultivate corn with 0 ≤ 𝑠 < 1.139246242 ∙
103 , while no farmer cultivates corn with 𝑠 ≥ 1.792381402 ∙ 103 . In the case of 
1.139246242 ∙ 103 ≤ 𝑠 < 1.792381402 ∙ 103, the upstream farmer does not cultivate corn 
while the downstream farmer still cultivates corn. 
 
Corollary 6. In the case of government subsidy of equal value to the farmers, the following 




















= 3.437158379 + 3.673086656 ∙ 10−3𝑠   
 
Corollary 6 reveals the effect of the equalized subsidy on the profits of the supply chain, 
customer surplus in switchgrass markets, and total social welfare. According as the amount of 
the equalized subsidy increases, the social welfare subtracted by the government expenditure, 
and the profits of the farmers and the utility company would increase. 
 
4.3. Results 
In Chapter 4, we analyzed the effect of government subsidies on the BSC. The subsidies 
are classified into two forms: (1) discriminated subsidies to the farmers (subsidy discrimination) 





Under subsidy discrimination, the results show that the government subsidy increases 
farmers’ water prices, their switchgrass production, and the utility company’s water allocation 
to a farmer who receives higher subsidy than the other farmer. Depending on the relation 
between the two discriminated subsidies, the subsidy policy can increase or decrease the players’ 
profits and the social welfare in the BSC. Also, an excessive amount of subsidy to a farmer can 
cause disappearance of the corn market or monopoly of the corn market and the switchgrass 
market. 
Under subsidy equalization, the results show that the government subsidy to the farmers 
increases farmers’ water prices and switchgrass production, and the social welfare subtracted 
by the government expenditure, whereas increasing subsidy decreases corn production and does 
not affect water allocation by the utility company. Compared to the discriminated subsidies, a 
higher equalized subsidy would improve the farmers’ profits and the social welfare subtracted 
by the government expenditure, in any case. However, excessive amount of subsidy could cause 
disappearance or monopoly of a corn market. 
Through parametric analysis, we found the effect of the government subsidy on the social 
welfare subtracted by the government expenditure under subsidy equalization, as shown in 





Curve (1), represents the change in social welfare subtracted by government expenditure 
according as the amount of the equalized subsidy to the farmers increases from 0 to 400. In 
Figure 4, a dotted line, Curve (2), represents the change in social welfare subtracted by 
government expenditure according as the amount of the discriminated subsidy to the upstream 
farmer increases from 0 to 800.  
In Figure 1, Point [A] addresses the social welfare without any subsidy. Point [B] 
represents social welfare under subsidy equalization with 𝑠𝑑 = 𝑠𝑢 = 400. In Figure 2, Point 
[C], Point [D], and Point [E] represent social welfare under subsidy discrimination with the 
budget of 800 for the sum of unit subsidy to the two farmers (𝑠𝑑 + 𝑠𝑢 = 800). Point [C] shows 
a case where the government provides subsidy only to the downstream farmer (𝑠𝑑 = 800, 𝑠𝑢 =
0), while Point [E] shows the opposite case where the government provides subsidy only to the 
upstream farmer (𝑠𝑑 = 800, 𝑠𝑢 = 0). Point [D] shows a case where the government provides 
an equal amount of subsidy to both farmers (𝑠𝑑 = 400, 𝑠𝑢 = 400), which is also represented 






Figure 3. Social welfare subtracted by government expenditure under subsidy equalization 
 






From the parametric analysis, we found that both forms of subsidy policy improve social 
welfare. From the perspective of the sum of the unit subsidies to the farmers, increasing the 
sum of the subsidies induces higher social welfare. Under a constrained budget for the sum of 
unit subsidy to the two farmers, subsidy discrimination shows higher social welfare in case of 
𝑠𝑑 < 𝑠𝑢 and lower social welfare in case of 𝑠𝑑 > 𝑠𝑢 compared to subsidy equalization (𝑠𝑑 =
𝑠𝑢). Increasing the subsidy to the upstream farmer is more efficient in improving social welfare 
than increasing the subsidy to the downstream farmer. 
Therefore, the government needs to decide the amount of the subsidies while also 
considering the dilemma between efficiency and equity of the policy. The effect of the subsidy 






5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
We proposed a game theoretical model of a biofuel supply chain (BSC) where two farmers, 
located in the downstream and the upstream, and a utility company make decisions throughout 
a three-stage leader-follower Stackelberg game. In the first stage, the two farmers compete on 
water price under Bertrand competition. In the second stage, the utility company allocates its 
water to the two farmers based on the quoted water price by the farmers. In the third stage, the 
two farmers compete on corn quantity and switchgrass quantity at a corn market and a 
switchgrass market under Cournot competition. We solved the problem by using backward 
induction method after deriving the KKT optimality conditions of the subproblems in each stage. 
We found the equilibrium of the decisions in the BSC and conducted sensitivity analysis to 
study the effect of the government subsidy on the BSC. Furthermore, we performed parametric 
analysis using realistic values from the literature. The result shows that the subsidies could 
improve social welfare unless they exceed certain limit that causes negative profits for farmers. 
Subsidy discrimination, especially, with higher subsidy to the upstream farmer than the 





 Although our model considers many realistic conditions, there are a possibility of making 
the model even closer to real-world problems. In future, we could replace the corn market and 
the switchgrass market with corn refineries and switchgrass refineries that are considered as 
players in the game of the BSC. Water consumption in biofuel production could affect the water 
supply and biomass prices. Through these extensions, we could analyze the reaction of the 
refineries to the decisions of the farmers and the utility company. Moreover, future research 
could consider the land type, yield amount, precipitation along with uncertainty in crop 
production for a multi-period model. This problem can be modeled through stochastic 
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 Appendix A shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Section 3.2.1.3.  
Appendix A.1. 
Appendix A.1. represents proof of Case [2] in Table 3.  
(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝒒𝒖
𝒄 ) − 2𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝒒𝒅
𝒄 − 𝛿𝑐𝜆1 = 0       (A-1-1) 
(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝒒𝒖
𝒔 + 𝑠𝑑) − 2𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝒒𝒅
𝒔 − 𝛿𝑠𝜆1 = 0      (A-1-2) 
(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝒒𝒅
𝒄 ) − 2𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝒒𝒖
𝒄 − 𝛿𝑐𝜆4 = 0       (A-1-3) 
(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝒒𝒅
𝒔 + 𝑠𝑢) − 2𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝒒𝒖
𝒔 − 𝛿𝑠𝜆4 = 0      (A-1-4) 
𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐𝒒𝒅
𝒄 − 𝛿𝑠𝒒𝒅
𝒔 = 0             (A-1-5) 
𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐𝒒𝒖
𝒄 − 𝛿𝑠𝒒𝒖
𝒔 = 0             (A-1-6) 
From Equation (A-1-1), Equation (A-1-3), Equation (A-1-2), and Equation (A-1-4), we 





































 Then we derive 𝜆2 and 𝜆4  by putting the above outputs into Equation (A-1-5) and 





























































































































   
 
Appendix A.2. 
 Appendix A.2. represents proof of Case [3] in Table 3. 
(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 2𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝒒𝒖
𝒄 − 𝛿𝑐𝜆4 = 0         (A-2-1) 
(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 + 𝑠𝑢) − 2𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝒒𝒖
𝒔 − 𝛿𝑠𝜆4 = 0        (A-2-2) 
𝑤𝑢 − 𝛿𝑐𝒒𝒖
𝒄 − 𝛿𝑠𝒒𝒖
𝒔 = 0             (A-2-3) 








      (A-2-4) 
𝑞𝑢
𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢
𝑠 , and 𝜆4 are derived by solving the simultaneous equations, Equation (A-2-3) and 




































































(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝒒𝒖
𝒄 ) − 2𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2𝒒𝒅
𝒄 − 𝛿𝑐𝜆1 = 0       (A-3-1) 
(𝑎𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠𝛼𝑠 − 𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝒒𝒖
𝒔 + 𝑠𝑑) − 2𝑏𝑠𝛼𝑠
2𝒒𝒅
𝒔 − 𝛿𝑠𝜆1 = 0      (A-3-2) 
𝑤𝑑 − 𝛿𝑐𝒒𝒅
𝒄 − 𝛿𝑠𝒒𝒅
𝒔 = 0             (A-3-3) 








      (A-3-4) 
𝑞𝑢
𝑐 , 𝑞𝑢
𝑠 , and 𝜆4 are derived by solving the simultaneous equations, Equation (A-3-3) and 
































































































































> 0  
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Appendix C. 
 Appendix C shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Table 4 in 
Subsection 3.2.2.4. Best responses of the utility company in the second stage could be derived 
by using the KKT conditions of the utility company’s problem as follows:  
ℒ3 = 𝜋ℎ + 𝜆7(𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖) + 𝜆8𝒘𝒅 + 𝜆9𝒘𝒖        (C-1) 
𝜕ℒ3
𝜕𝒘𝒅
= 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆8 = 0         (C-2) 
𝜕ℒ3
𝜕𝒘𝒖
= 𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆9 = 0          (C-3) 





0 ≤ 𝜆8 ⊥ [𝒘𝒅] ≥ 0              (C-5) 
0 ≤ 𝜆9 ⊥ [𝒘𝒖] ≥ 0              (C-6) 
We have eight cases for positivity of 𝜆7, 𝜆8, and 𝜆8, since each lambda can be equal to or 
greater than zero.  
(1) 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 0    
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 = 0            (C-1-2) 
𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒖 = 0              (C-1-3) 
𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0              (C-1-4) 
𝒘𝒅 ≥ 0                (C-1-5) 







, 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 0 
 
(2) 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 > 0   
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 = 0            (C-2-2) 
𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒖 + 𝜆9 = 0             (C-2-3) 
𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0              (C-2-4) 
𝒘𝒅 ≥ 0                (C-3-5) 





, 𝒘𝒖 = 0, 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = −𝑝𝑢 






(3) 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 > 0, 𝜆9 = 0   
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 + 𝜆8 = 0           (C-3-2) 
𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒖 = 0              (C-3-3) 
𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0              (C-3-4) 
𝒘𝒅 = 0                (C-3-5) 
𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0                (C-3-6) 
𝒘𝒅 = 0, 𝒘𝒖 =
𝑝𝑢
2𝑐𝑤
, 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = −𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 , 𝜆9 = 0 
This solution is infeasible, since 𝑝𝑑 > 0 and 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 > 0 result in 𝜆8 < 0. 
 
(4) 𝜆7 > 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 0   
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 = 0           (C-4-2) 
𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 = 0             (C-4-3) 
𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 = 0              (C-4-4) 
𝒘𝒅 ≥ 0                (C-4-5) 










, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 0 
 
(5) 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 > 0, 𝜆9 > 0  
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 + 𝜆8 = 0           (C-5-2) 
𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒖 + 𝜆9 = 0             (C-5-3) 
𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0              (C-5-4) 





𝒘𝒖 = 0                (C-5-6) 
𝒘𝒅 = 0, 𝒘𝒖 = 0, 𝜆7 = 0, 𝜆8 = −𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 , 𝜆9 = −𝑝𝑢 
This solution is infeasible, since 𝑝𝑑 > 0, 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 > 0, and 𝑝𝑢 > 0 result in 𝜆8 < 0 and 𝜆9 < 0. 
 
(6) 𝜆7 > 0, 𝜆8 > 0, 𝜆9 = 0  
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆8 = 0          (C-6-2) 
𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 = 0             (C-6-3) 
𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 = 0              (C-6-4) 
𝒘𝒅 = 0                (C-6-5) 
𝒘𝒖 ≥ 0                (C-6-6) 
𝒘𝒅 = 0, 𝒘𝒖 = 𝑤, 𝜆7 = 𝑝𝑢, 𝜆8 = −𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢, 𝜆9 = 0 
 
(7) 𝜆7 > 0, 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 > 0   
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 = 0           (C-7-2) 
𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒖 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆9 = 0            (C-7-3) 
𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 = 0              (C-7-4) 
𝒘𝒅 ≥ 0                (C-7-5) 
𝒘𝒖 = 0                (C-7-6) 
𝒘𝒅 = 𝑤, 𝒘𝒖 = 0, 𝜆7 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 , 𝜆8 = 0, 𝜆9 = 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 
 
(8) 𝜆7 > 0, 𝜆8 > 0, 𝜆9 > 0  
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑐𝑤𝒘𝒅 − 𝜆7 + 𝜆8 = 0          (C-8-2) 





𝑤 − 𝒘𝒅 − 𝒘𝒖 = 0              (C-8-4) 
𝒘𝒅 = 0                (C-8-5) 
𝒘𝒖 = 0                (C-8-6) 
𝒘𝒅 = 0, 𝒘𝒖 = 0 
This solution is infeasible, since 𝑤 should be positive. 
 
Appendix D. 





























> 0  
 The above results are only applied to a case of: 
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 ≥ 2𝑐𝑤𝑤, 
𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 𝑝𝑢 ≥ −2𝑐𝑤𝑤,  
and  







 Appendix E shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Proposition 1 in 
Section 3.2.3.3. From the farmers’ KKT conditions in the first stage, Equations (53), (54), (55), 
and (56), we have two equations for 𝑝𝑑 and 𝑝𝑢.  
[(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2{(𝑞𝑑

























𝑝𝑑 = 0       (E-1) 
[(𝑎𝑐𝛼𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝛼𝑐) − 𝑏𝑐𝛼𝑐
2{(𝑞𝑑






















𝑝𝑢 = 0       (E-2) 
We have the following results from the best responses of the utility company in the second 
stage and the farmers in the third stage: 
(𝑞𝑑







































































































































































































𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 = 0            (E-2’) 
 
























































































+ 𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑝𝑢 − 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 = 0        (E-2’’) 
 





















+ (−2𝑝𝑑 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 𝑝𝑢 −

























+ (𝑝𝑑 + 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝑝𝑢 −
2𝑐𝑤𝑤) = 0              (E-2’’’) 
 
Then we find the equilibrium values of 𝑝𝑑 and 𝑝𝑢  after solving the above simultaneous 
equations, as follows: 
𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 = 𝐴 − 2𝑐𝑤𝑤 +
2𝐵𝑑+𝐵𝑢−𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒
3
     
𝑝𝑢








































 Appendix F shows the calculation and the proof for derivation used in Section 3.2.4.  
Appendix F.1.  
Appendix F.1 represents proof of Proposition 2-1 which demonstrates Equilibrium of 
Domain [2]. Under the conditions of (2-1) 𝐵𝑑 + 𝐵𝑢 ≥ 6𝑐𝑤𝑤 − 𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 2𝐴, (2-2) 𝐵𝑑 − 𝐵𝑢 ≥
−𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 6𝑐𝑤𝑤 , and (2-3)  𝐵𝑑 − 𝐵𝑢 ≤ −𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 6𝑐𝑤𝑤 , the best responses of the utility 















In Domain [2], we find the equilibrium values of the utility company’s decision on water 
allocation by substituting 𝑝𝑑
𝑁𝐸 and 𝑝𝑢
𝑁𝐸 into the best responses of the water allocations in 



































Then, we find the equilibrium values of the farmers’ decisions on land allocation by 
substituting (𝑤𝑑)
𝑁𝐸1 and (𝑤𝑢)
𝑁𝐸1 into the best responses of the land allocation in the third 









































Appendix F.2 represents proof of Proposition 2-2 which demonstrates Equilibrium of 
Domain [3]. Under Condition (3-1) of  𝐵𝑑 − 𝐵𝑢 ≤ −𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 − 6𝑐𝑤𝑤, the equilibrium values of 
the utility company’s decision on the water allocations of Domain [3] in the second stage are 
as follows: 
(𝑤𝑑)
𝑁𝐸2 = 0  
(𝑤𝑢)





In Domain [3], the corn market and the switchgrass market are the monopoly of the 
upstream farmer since the downstream farmer does not produce any crop in the third stage. The 
equilibrium values of the farmers’ decision on the land allocation of Domain [3] in the third 
stage are as follows: 
(𝑞𝑑
𝑐 )𝑁𝐸2 = 0  
(𝑞𝑑






















Appendix F.3 represents proof of Proposition 2-2 which demonstrates Equilibrium of 
Domain [4]. Under Condition (3-1) of  𝐵𝑑 − 𝐵𝑢 ≥ −𝑝𝑒𝛼𝑒 + 6𝑐𝑤𝑤, the equilibrium values of 
the utility company’s decision on the water allocations of Domain [4] in the second stage are 
as follows: 
(𝑤𝑑)
𝑁𝐸3 = 𝑤  
(𝑤𝑢)
𝑁𝐸3 = 0  
In Domain [4], the corn market and the switchgrass market are the monopoly of the upstream 
farmer since the downstream farmer does not produce any crop in the third stage. The 


























𝑐 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0   
(𝑞𝑢
𝑠 )𝑁𝐸3 = 0  
 
Appendix G. 

























































































































































> 0  
 
Appendix H. 



















> 0  
𝜕𝑤𝑑
𝜕𝑠
= 0   
𝜕𝑤𝑢
𝜕𝑠






































> 0  
 
